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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
 Posted - January 24 2006 : 06:47:11 AM
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AZ
."If the sole purpose was to coordinate their arrival It was not the sole purpose.By continuing further South Custer was also to cut off any possible escape of the Indians past his left flank.
DC
Humphrey: "If you trace the route indicated in Terry's orders, you see that Custer could never have traversed that route in the time indicated, no matter what."
I take it that the above is Mr Humphrey's post.Well just to clarify-----Custer had 15 days rations with him and his orders were to report to Terry not later than the expiration of the time for which his troops were rationed.So Mr Humphrey is in error.
And if the mules pulled in with the troopers,
If the 7th had moved at the same pace as the mules they would have arrived at Reno hill at 5.25 pm.What then?
Change any element and you get into whatif land.
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 24 2006 : 07:41:34 AM
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| Wild--"If the sole purpose was to coordinate their arrival It was not the sole purpose.By continuing further South Custer was also to cut off any possible escape of the Indians past his left flank." Something that has bothered me about this coordinated effort is the timing to the day of arrival of both units. It would seem that if they knew where the indians were then Custer did not need to scout to the south. If the indians had moved to the south Terry would be further behind still leaving Custer to engage with the 7th anyway. If the indians decided to flee rather than move a short distance in any direction the army couldn't catch them. It would seem to me that Terry should have kept both units together until striking distance by the infantry was reached, then deploy cavalry as they were intended and use the infantry to engage those willing to fight. It seems to me the overriding fear was that the indians would flee which explains why Terry split into two his commands. |
“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
SEMPER FI |
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 24 2006 : 11:08:23 AM
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quote:
Humphrey: "If you trace the route indicated in Terry's orders, you see that Custer could never have traversed that route in the time indicated, no matter what."
I take it that the above is Mr Humphrey's post.Well just to clarify-----Custer had 15 days rations with him and his orders were to report to Terry not later than the expiration of the time for which his troops were rationed.So Mr Humphrey is in error.
Both Terry's testimony and common sense make it perfectly clear that the two columns (Custer's and Gibbons') were to rendezvous and the timing of the rendezvous was based on the estimated time it would take Gibbons to arrive.
To say that Custer was expected to not be there when Gibbons arrived is simply false. |
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 24 2006 : 11:17:22 AM
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Something that has bothered me about this coordinated effort is the timing to the day of arrival of both units. It would seem that if they knew where the indians were then Custer did not need to scout to the south. If the indians had moved to the south Terry would be further behind still leaving Custer to engage with the 7th anyway. If the indians decided to flee rather than move a short distance in any direction the army couldn't catch them. It would seem to me that Terry should have kept both units together until striking distance by the infantry was reached, then deploy cavalry as they were intended and use the infantry to engage those willing to fight. It seems to me the overriding fear was that the indians would flee which explains why Terry split into two his commands.
In his article in the Journal of the Military Service Institute (January, 1896), Colonel Hughes, who was present on the campaign as a member of Terry's staff and who was present when Terry discussed his plans with Custer and Gibbons makes it very clear that the plan was to "enclose" the indians between the two columns. What Terry envisioned was Custer marching down the Little Big Horn and Gibbons up the same river, and catching the indians between them.
Hughes (who was a staunch defender of Terry) says Custer was duty bound to maneuver so as to eat up enough time to synchronize the rendezvous of the two columns. |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - January 24 2006 : 11:21:57 AM
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AZ
It would seem that if they knew where the indians were then Custer did not need to scout to the south.
When Terry met with Custer and Gibbon they knew as much as Reno had reported which was that there was a large Indian trail turning off the Rosebud and headed in the direction of the LBH.You will recall that Terry suggested that Custer scout both Tullock creek and the tongue river both areas about 25 miles North/South of the Rosebud.So at that planning meeting they only a rough idea as to the location of the Indians.
If the indians had moved to the south Terry would be further behind still leaving Custer to engage with the 7th anyway.
True but then Terry was never keen on getting too far away from the Far West which could only navigate as far as the junction of the LBH and the BH.But the subplot was always that Custer would strike first if he thought fit.
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 24 2006 : 12:49:24 PM
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Hughes can't be patted into objective shape. He was not only a Terry partisan, he was his brother in law. (It was skill that got him his job....) In the charged atmosphere that arose from Grant's offhand condemnation of Custer (more right than wrong) at the Centennial, and La Custer's hysterical responses, everyone was accused of something and their partisans defended them.
There are slight differences, I think, in the written orders Hughes provided Grant and other versions. Then, there is the Mary Adams Affair, which requires you to believe, these days, that there were three Adams sisters, two named Maria and Mary, and that these two worked alternately for the Custers, and although neither could write their names, an X on a document was to mean something, and that document exculpating Custer to a degree and appearing, miraculously, after Terry's death. It pretty obviously was the work of Nelson Miles, who later tried to pretend something he'd written was the work of a 7th officer.
These family relationships have to be weighed. Hughes reacted like a cat clunked with a spade whenever Terry was portrayed less than favorably, as did family members of all the participants. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
Edited by - Dark Cloud on January 24 2006 1:09:43 PM |
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 24 2006 : 12:55:31 PM
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These family relationships have to be weighed. Hughes reacted like a cat clunked with a spade whenever Terry was portrayed less than favorably, as did family members of all the participants.
True -- which is why I identify him as a Terry defender. Nevertheless, when you put together the actual scheme of maneuver -- both as written in Terry's orders and as executed on the ground, Hugh's general point, that Terry intended to "enclose" the indians with Custer approaching from the South and Gibbons from the North is obviously correct.
In such an operation, timing is everything -- clearly Terry meant for the two columns to make contact as simultaneously as possible. |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - January 24 2006 : 1:13:51 PM
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Mr Humprhey
Both Terry's testimony and common sense make it perfectly clear that the two columns (Custer's and Gibbons') were to rendezvous and the timing of the rendezvous was based on the estimated time it would take Gibbons to arrive.
The only possible rendezvous indicated in Terry's orders is the junction of the LBH and the BH and the timing was anytime within 15 days.
But as you say let's use common sense.First of all the itinerary was agreed by Custer.Now if he had done as was suggested it would have added 75 miles to his journey or 2.5 days march.It should be noted that he had covered the 72 miles from his camp on the Yellowstone to his Busby camp in a similar time.So if instead of heading along Davis creek he had gone South to the Tongue he would have arrived at the Indian village on the morning of the 27th.And guess who also arrived there on the morning of the 27th.? |
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
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Posted - January 24 2006 : 1:48:36 PM
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The only possible rendezvous indicated in Terry's orders is the junction of the LBH and the BH and the timing was anytime within 15 days.
You say that, but the evidence is to the contrary -- Terry said the plan was based on his estimate how fast his subordinates could march. The desired rendezvous was when the first unit arrived at the mouth of the Little Big Horn.
[/quote]But as you say let's use common sense.First of all the itinerary was agreed by Custer.Now if he had done as was suggested it would have added 75 miles to his journey or 2.5 days march.It should be noted that he had covered the 72 miles from his camp on the Yellowstone to his Busby camp in a similar time.So if instead of heading along Davis creek he had gone South to the Tongue he would have arrived at the Indian village on the morning of the 27th.And guess who also arrived there on the morning of the 27th.?[/quote]
Except that rate of march was not sustainable. And the distance is rather greater. I scale it off the De Lorme TopoUSA database, and make it closer to another 100 miles.
In addition there is the problem of scouting the headwaters of Tullocks Creek. This could be done three ways:
Course of Action A. By sending a small detatchment (Perhaps herendeen alone.) The disadvantage is that it assumes the indians are not there. If the scouts find anything, the regiment is moving away and can't be contacted. So this method induces some delay.
Course of Action B. By sending a larger detatchment, on the assumption this detatchment will be able to handle any indians found. This has the same disadvantages as CAA A, plus means the detatchment is subtracted from the regiment's fighting strength unless the regiment waits for it to return.
Course of Action C. Take the entire regiment into the Tullocks Creek watershed, send out cloverleaf patrols. This thoroughtly scouts the headwaters, and allows for sufficient force to deal with any indians found and keeps the regiment together. The disadvantage is that it adds another 50 miles or so to the distance marched.
Whichever course is taken induces a delay into the maneuver.
And finally, let me point out that Terry based his plan, according to his own words, on the assumption that Custer's marches would be 30 miles a day. |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - January 24 2006 : 4:54:19 PM
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You say that, but the evidence is to the contrary
I don't say that, it is in Terry's orders.
In addition there is the problem of scouting the headwaters of Tullocks Creek.
Terry's orders were to give priority to the Indian trail.Tullock creek was a secondary consideration and no delay is necessary if scouts are sent cross country [minimum of two one to report to Custer the other to Terry]via the headwaters of Tullock Creek and then onto Custer's Busby camp.
And finally, let me point out that Terry based his plan, according to his own words, on the assumption that Custer's marches would be 30 miles a day.
Your case is that Custer did not have the time in which to carry out his orders.There is no time stated in Terry's orders and he only indicates that his destination is the junction of the LBH and the BH where he will take position as a blocking force.There is nothing about a simultaneous attack by both forces.All that was required of Custer was that he allow sufficent time for the slower moving blocking force to take position.Custer [provided he followed his instructions] could not be too late but he could be too early. |
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 24 2006 : 5:13:11 PM
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You say that, but the evidence is to the contraryI don't say that, it is in Terry's orders.
Terry's orders do not require Custer to spend 15 days futzing around -- the No later than time simply means no matter what happens, link up when your rations run out.
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In addition there is the problem of scouting the headwaters of Tullocks Creek.
Terry's orders were to give priority to the Indian trail.Tullock creek was a secondary consideration and no delay is necessary if scouts are sent cross country [minimum of two one to report to Custer the other to Terry]via the headwaters of Tullock Creek and then onto Custer's Busby camp.
Actually Terry's orders give priority to preventing the indians' escape, and say to leave the trail if crosses the divide.
Yes, a single scout could have been sent via the Tullocks Creek drainage -- but unless we assume (as Custer could not) that that drainage is empty, there are disadvantages with that approach, as I pointed out.
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And finally, let me point out that Terry based his plan, according to his own words, on the assumption that Custer's marches would be 30 miles a day.Your case is that Custer did not have the time in which to carry out his orders.There is no time stated in Terry's orders and he only indicates that his destination is the junction of the LBH and the BH where he will take position as a blocking force.There is nothing about a simultaneous attack by both forces.All that was required of Custer was that he allow sufficent time for the slower moving blocking force to take position.Custer [provided he followed his instructions] could not be too late but he could be too early.
If you take his orders literally, they could not be carried out. The key event in the plan is the rendezvous with Gibbons -- and that sets the clock for the whole operation. If Gibbons had fought or flushed the indians while Custer was on the headwaters of the Tongue, Custer and Terry would be degraded to this day. |
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 25 2006 : 08:10:10 AM
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"Both Terry's testimony and common sense make it perfectly clear that the two columns (Custer's and Gibbons') were to rendezvous and the timing of the rendezvous was based on the estimated time it would take Gibbons to arrive.
To say that Custer was expected to not be there when Gibbons arrived is simply false." The converse is also false. There may have been a desire to rendezvous but not a expectation. You can't have it both ways. Either they knew exactly where they were going and could plan on being there at the same time or the didn't. If there was a fear the indians might move south and Custer was to move that direction how could he also be expected to meet time certain anywhere with Gibbons. There is only one sure way to arrive at the same time and that would have been to have Terry with Custer and Gibbons together until actual identification of the location of the village. |
“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
SEMPER FI |
Edited by - AZ Ranger on January 25 2006 08:32:28 AM |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - January 25 2006 : 09:31:43 AM
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Terry's orders do not require Custer to spend 15 days futzing around -- the No later than time simply means no matter what happens, link up when your rations run out.
Read the order.Terry say it is impossible to give any definite instructions in regard to Custers movements.Thus 15 days supplies to find the trail move South and also scout Tullock creek.The area of operations was defined and the route to be travelled which if conformed to would have both forces advancing towards each from different directions on the LBH.Custer was not limited by a precise timetable.
Actually Terry's orders give priority to preventing the indians' escape,And I thought it was to survey the flora and fauna and count DC's butterflies in the valley of the LBH.
If you take his orders literally, they could not be carried out. The key event in the plan is the rendezvous with Gibbons -- and that sets the clock for the whole operation. If Gibbons had fought or flushed the indians while Custer was on the headwaters of the Tongue, Custer and Terry would be degraded to this day.
With an unknown factor ie the location of the Indians in a plan room for flexibility has to be built in.Terry expected to get to the mouth of the LBH sometime on the 26th.This was agreed at their meeting.Now according to Gray at 4.00 on the afternoon of the 25TH Custer had covered 100 miles.If he had gone South he would have been on the tongue rather than at MTC.And he had a day and a half to then proceed in the direction of the LBH where he would have been in position to attack on the 27th in consort with Gibbons blocking force.
In fact given the nature of the terrain and not knowing exactly the position of the Indians and also the disparity in speed of the two columns Terry's timing was spot on.
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 25 2006 : 6:06:32 PM
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With an unknown factor ie the location of the Indians in a plan room for flexibility has to be built in.Terry expected to get to the mouth of the LBH sometime on the 26th.This was agreed at their meeting.Now according to Gray at 4.00 on the afternoon of the 25TH Custer had covered 100 miles.If he had gone South he would have been on the tongue rather than at MTC.And he had a day and a half to then proceed in the direction of the LBH where he would have been in position to attack on the 27th in consort with Gibbons blocking force.
In fact given the nature of the terrain and not knowing exactly the position of the Indians and also the disparity in speed of the two columns Terry's timing was spot on.
At 30 miles a day, which was the standard rate of march, and which is the figure he gave Terry, he could not have travelled the indicated route and arrived a the junction of the Little Big Horn and Big Horn on the 26th.
If he waited to hear from scouts about the presence or absence of indians in Tullocks Creek watershed, that adds even more time. |
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 25 2006 : 6:11:48 PM
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To say that Custer was expected to not be there when Gibbons arrived is simply false." The converse is also false. There may have been a desire to rendezvous but not a expectation. You can't have it both ways. Either they knew exactly where they were going and could plan on being there at the same time or the didn't. If there was a fear the indians might move south and Custer was to move that direction how could he also be expected to meet time certain anywhere with Gibbons. There is only one sure way to arrive at the same time and that would have been to have Terry with Custer and Gibbons together until actual identification of the location of the village.
Actually, you can have it both ways. If you analyze Terry's orders (which is the first step in Troop Leading Procedures), it is clear that he expected the rendezvous to take place on schedule. That is, after all, the whole reason behind dividing his force -- to allow them to recombine against the enemy at the critical time and place.
While Terry does realize circumstances may prevent such a junction, he clearly expects Custer to do all he can to make it happen. |
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 25 2006 : 10:43:43 PM
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"Actually, you can have it both ways. If you analyze Terry's orders (which is the first step in Troop Leading Procedures), it is clear that he expected the rendezvous to take place on schedule. That is, after all, the whole reason behind dividing his force -- to allow them to recombine against the enemy at the critical time and place."
Vern-- There has been years and years of analyzing Terry's orders and you can pick and defend any position by taking parts of it you choose. "It is, of course, impossible to give you any definite instructions in regard to this movement...." Since we know there was very little training at the time I doubt Custer went through step one of Troop Leadership Procedures rather he went to step one of Let Custer Decide What To Do and that is what he did and you can argue that is found within Terry's order also.
If it is as clear as you state, what was Custer to do if he found the indians trying to escape to the south, go to Gibbons to recombine or "preclude the possibility of escape of the indians" therefore leaving Gibbons behind.
Course of Action A. By sending a small detachment (Perhaps herendeen alone.) The disadvantage is that it assumes the indians are not there. If the scouts find anything, the regiment is moving away and can't be contacted. So this method induces some delay.
Course of Action B. By sending a larger detatchment, on the assumption this detatchment will be able to handle any indians found. This has the same disadvantages as CAA A, plus means the detatchment is subtracted from the regiment's fighting strength unless the regiment waits for it to return.
Course of Action C. Take the entire regiment into the Tullocks Creek watershed, send out cloverleaf patrols. This thoroughtly scouts the headwaters, and allows for sufficient force to deal with any indians found and keeps the regiment together. The disadvantage is that it adds another 50 miles or so to the distance marched.
If you take Terry's orders literally there is another course of action. Custer could go himself with one scout. "you should thoroughly examine the upper part of Tullock's Creek, and you should endeavor to send a scout through to Colonel Gibbon's column...." Far fetched maybe but when Terry describes Gibbons scout he states "The lower part of the Creek will be examined by a detachment from Colonel Gibbon's command." So if Terry wanted Custer to send a detachment or the whole Regiment why didn't he state it as he did about Gibbon's command.
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“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
SEMPER FI |
Edited by - AZ Ranger on January 25 2006 10:46:03 PM |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - January 26 2006 : 03:45:53 AM
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At 30 miles a day, which was the standard rate of march, and which is the figure he gave Terry, he could not have travelled the indicated route and arrived a the junction of the Little Big Horn and Big Horn on the 26th.
The exercise called for a strike force and a blocking force.The blocking force would be in position on the 26th so Custer was expected to attack after this date not before and after he had scouted the Tongue.A rendezvous is not part of the attack plan but the coordinated positioning of the two forces in order to enclose the Indians.
Your arguement rules out all flexibility and expects precision timing in an area of operations greater than 100 square miles against forces whose exact positions and strenght are unknown.Use some of that common sense you have advised us to use. |
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 26 2006 : 10:04:32 AM
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The exercise called for a strike force and a blocking force.The blocking force would be in position on the 26th so Custer was expected to attack after this date not before and after he had scouted the Tongue.A rendezvous is not part of the attack plan but the coordinated positioning of the two forces in order to enclose the Indians.
The attack plan is only part of the campaign plan. The orders specify an rendezvous.
Note that the orders allow deviation if the situation is not as expected. It turns out that the situation was as expected, however the maps were not accurate and the indians were becoming aware that the Army was in the vicinity.
Properly executed (and undiscovered), Custer sould have swung south (but not as far as his orders indicated), gaining time for Gibbons to come up, then crossed into the Little Big Horn valley and marched downstream.
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Your arguement rules out all flexibility
No, it doesn't -- it merely points out that at the expected rate of march, Custer could not have followed the route outlined in the orders in time to cooperate with Gibbons.
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and expects precision timing in an area of operations greater than 100 square miles against forces whose exact positions and strenght are unknown.
No, it doesn't -- how does pointing out that at 30 miles a day, Custer and Gibbons would have arrived at different times add up to "expecting precision timing?" |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - January 26 2006 : 4:45:35 PM
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No, it doesn't -- how does pointing out that at 30 miles a day, Custer and Gibbons would have arrived at different times add up to "expecting precision timing?"
Arrived at whereat different times?
The orders specify an rendezvous.
Quote the section from the orders specifying this.
Note that the orders allow deviation if the situation is not as expected. It turns out that the situation was as expected,
Terry's orders cover this ---he thinks that you should still proceed southward.
No, it doesn't -- it merely points out that at the expected rate of march, Custer could not have followed the route outlined in the orders in time to cooperate with Gibbons.
Custer was the strike force and nothing would happen until he arrived.As I 'v already stated he could not be too late but he could be too early. The planned sequence was very simple---blocking force in position then strike force attacks not the other way around.
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 26 2006 : 5:01:53 PM
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No, it doesn't -- how does pointing out that at 30 miles a day, Custer and Gibbons would have arrived at different times add up to "expecting precision timing?"Arrived at whereat different times?
I don't understand what you mean here.
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The orders specify an rendezvous.
Quote the section from the orders specifying this.
From the order: "The column of Col. Gibbon is now in motion for the mouth of the Big Horn. As soon as it reaches that point it will cross the Yellowstone and move up at least as for as the forks of the Big and Little Big Horn. Of course its future movements must be controlled by circumstances as they may arise; but it is hoped that the indians, if upon the Little Big Horn, may be so nearly enclosed by the two columns that their escape will be impossible.
Terry's second message to Sheridan: "We calculated it would take Gibbon's column until the twenty-sixth to reach the mouth of the Little Big Horn, and that the wide sweep which I proposed Custer should make would require so much time that Gibbon would be able to cooperate with him in attacking any indians found on that stream.'
Note that the orders allow deviation if the situation is not as expected. It turns out that the situation was as expected,
Terry's orders cover this ---he thinks that you should still proceed southward.
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No, it doesn't -- it merely points out that at the expected rate of march, Custer could not have followed the route outlined in the orders in time to cooperate with Gibbons.Custer was the strike force and nothing would happen until he arrived.As I 'v already stated he could not be too late but he could be too early. The planned sequence was very simple---blocking force in position then strike force attacks not the other way around.
If Gibbon's column flushed the indians, he would be too late. |
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 27 2006 : 08:34:13 AM
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"Note that the orders allow deviation if the situation is not as expected. It turns out that the situation was as expected, however the maps were not accurate and the indians were becoming aware that the Army was in the vicinity."
"He will, however, indicate to you his own views of what your action should be, and he desires that you should conform to them unless you shall see sufficient reason for departing from them. It appears as clear as anything in Terry's desires that no one except Custer can make the choice of departing for sufficient reason. It doesn't say if your scouts advise etc. All Custer needed was sufficient reason to continue if the trail spoken of turn towards the Little Horn. If commanders have the great latitude you speak of and he thought he had sufficient reason he could do whatever he desired. |
“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
SEMPER FI |
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Benteen
Lt. Colonel
Status: offline |
Posted - January 27 2006 : 09:35:50 AM
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If I may...."Terry's second message to Sheridan: "We calculated it would take Gibbon's column until the twenty-sixth to reach the mouth of the Little Big Horn, and that the wide sweep which I proposed Custer should make would require so much time that Gibbon would be able to cooperate with him in attacking any indians found on that stream."
There is something here in this statement that is quite revealing. Read it carefully. From this and other statements it seems like they knew that the indians were in the vicinity of the LBH or BH river system. This was concluded from Reno's scout. So yes they definitely did know the general area where the indians were. Terry's letter of instruction specifically directed Custer not to follow that trail. "He will, however, indicate to you his own views of what your action should be, and he desires that you should conform to them unless you shall see sufficient reason for departing from them." Much, way too much has been made of this statment. There was no "sufficient reason" to depart from his orders. The only "sufficient reason" to do so would have been "when in nearly in contact with the enemy." This was the only requirement that Terry stated that would have been of "sufficient reason". Custer was not any where near the indians at the time he departed and followed that trail. In fact he was well over what 30 or so miles away? He didn't think that they had been discovered, in fact this thought prevailed right up until his conversation with one of the indian scouts after returning from the Crows Nest! If he thought that they had been discovered, then why the night march? Terry's instructions are pretty clear. There wasn't sufficient reaason to depart from them. And Vern you are correct in your assesment of them. There wasn't any reason for Colonel Hughes to lie. In fact his statement gives absolute proof of the plan.
On another thread here I have given an analysis of Custer's motive of "opportunity". This based upon several letters written by Boston and Custer prior to this deviation. There was no way that Custer wasn't going to deviate when and if the opportunity arose. That much is clear from those letters. Was this wrong? Orders wise, yes. Because it means that Custer disobeyed orders. Would it have been justified if Custer won? A resounding, yes. The payoff for Custer outweighed the disobedience. So then one must ask. What was Custer's plan? What was it that led him to believe that his regiment alone could handle that many warriors? And finally... What went wrong?
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 27 2006 : 10:31:41 AM
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quote:
On another thread here I have given an analysis of Custer's motive of "opportunity". This based upon several letters written by Boston and Custer prior to this deviation. There was no way that Custer wasn't going to deviate when and if the opportunity arose. That much is clear from those letters. Was this wrong? Orders wise, yes. Because it means that Custer disobeyed orders. Would it have been justified if Custer won? A resounding, yes. The payoff for Custer outweighed the disobedience. So then one must ask.
Let me try to answer the three questions below:
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What was Custer's plan? What was it that led him to believe that his regiment alone could handle that many warriors? And finally... What went wrong
1. Custer did not have a plan in the conventional sense -- he was playing it by ear. There was an intention to encircle the indians, hitting them from two directions -- but it never reached the stage of a plan that had been worked out and commuicated to his subordinates.
2. He thought the indians would run, not fight
3. He failed to synchronize his attack. As I have said before, he had 12 companies, but never got more than 3 into action at any one time. |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - January 27 2006 : 11:07:48 AM
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Benteen
Would it have been justified if Custer won? A resounding, yes.By the same token then if he had followed orders and been defeated then he must be held responsible.
A system which encouraged commanders to disobey orders provided they were sucessful would only lead to chaos in the long term.
Mr Humphrey
The orders specify an rendezvous.
Your point is that Custer did not have time to make the rendezvous if he had followed orders.Now what I want to know is where was this rendezvous to be ?
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 27 2006 : 11:36:47 AM
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quote:
The orders specify a rendezvous.
Your point is that Custer did not have time to make the rendezvous if he had followed orders.Now what I want to know is where was this rendezvous to be ?
From the order: "The column of Col. Gibbon is now in motion for the mouth of the Big Horn. As soon as it reaches that point it will cross the Yellowstone and move up at least as far as the forks of the Big and Little Big Horn. Of course its future movements must be controlled by circumstances as they may arise; but it is hoped that the indians, if upon the Little Big Horn, may be so nearly enclosed by the two columns that their escape will be impossible.
Terry's second message to Sheridan: "We calculated it would take Gibbon's column until the twenty-sixth to reach the mouth of the Little Big Horn, and that the wide sweep which I proposed Custer should make would require so much time that Gibbon would be able to cooperate with him in attacking any indians found on that stream.'
(My emphasis in both paragraphs.)
Let me point out also that when Custer departed the mouth of the Rosebud, he was operating under oral, not written orders. The written order was sent after him. Custer therefore was obviously privy to Terry's thinking (as Hughes says). And Terry clearly wanted a rendezvous at the mouth of the Little Big Horn on the 26th of June. And Custer knew it.
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Springfield Carbine
