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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
    
   
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 31 2007 : 7:51:54 PM
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It wasn't the fault of the Springfield carbine or the ammunition it was simply overwhelming odds by the Indians. Did some carbines fail to extract, of course, but not enough to change the outcome. Were the gilded cased rounds more subject to failure then the brass rounds Custer carried? Yes How many rounds did the trooper have on his body or in the saddle bags of the horses that were run off. Simply moving from mounted to on the ground skirmish lines reduces effectiveness by 25% is there anyone suggesting the carbine or ammunition failed at higher percentage.
Reno's 6 carbines were the failures of 7 companies. Not significant I would guess. Reno's troopers did not clean them any better then Custer's. I believe Custer's trooper did not have to much time to get them dirty anyway.
At ranges over 250 yards the troopers have better firepower. Firepower is a function of the rate of fire plus the damage it can inflict. Lack of being able to hit at distance is not the fault of the carbine or ammuntion rather its training for accuracy under stress which is something the army did not recognize till after LBH.
AZ Ranger |
“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
SEMPER FI |
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Brent
Lt. Colonel
    
 
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 01 2007 : 05:49:12 AM
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DC makes a good point also--the more complicated the weapon, the more that can go wrong. In the combat situation, unless the soldier can fix whatever problem exists all by himself, he's otherwise out of luck. No armorer available then--.
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Smcf
Captain
    
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Posted - November 01 2007 : 08:12:24 AM
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Overwhelming odds it is. Much of the protracted Indian offensive on Reno Hill consisted literally of sticks and stones. Mind you, some of those sticks were particularly sharp. |
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Brent
Lt. Colonel
    
 
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 01 2007 : 3:01:12 PM
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Didn't I also read where the Indians threw clods of dirt at them?? |
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prolar
Major
    

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Posted - November 01 2007 : 5:05:43 PM
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AZ, of coarse forming a dismounted skirmish line ,reduces manpower by 25% but you aren;t saying that three dismounted troopers in stable firing positions are 25% less effective than four that are trying to maintain control of scared horses while trying to aim,fire and reload? I believe the six carbines after the Reno battle were ones beyond field repair. This doesn't address the ones that had to have spent rounds punched or pried out. My personal opinion is that very few warriors were hit at ranges beyond 250 yds and even fewer soldiers,but I don't have any data on this.
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Sgtmajor109th
Captain
    
USA
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Posted - November 01 2007 : 9:40:17 PM
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At 250 yards you may have had better firepower, if the weapon was properly zero for that range. If that was the max effective range for that weapon then you had only 50% chance of hitting what you where aiming at. You also have to have the time to properly sight and fire at your target. I don't think that the men on Custer Ridge or the valley fight had that kind of time. A great deal of ammo was shot up in the valley fight, without much damage to the Indians. I still say, that the overwelming odds, and the tactics used by the Indians, plus there added fire power, in my opinion the carbine was not effective in the LBH battle. The odds and and superior firepower made the difference. I am not saying it wasn't a fine weapon, it just wasn't a effective weapon that day. |
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Brent
Lt. Colonel
    
 
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 02 2007 : 09:02:07 AM
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Part of me thinks though that 600+ soldiers with the Springfields and plenty of ammo should have been able to handle matters that day-- |
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Sgtmajor109th
Captain
    
USA
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Posted - November 02 2007 : 11:58:51 AM
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Brent, you are more then likely correct, but it seems almost in possible when you think of how Custer kept splitting his command. Perhaps if he had kept his command, all five companies together he may have had a better chance, and to find a location he could defend. I feel if he had stayed on the east side of MTC and around Weir Point, he may have caused the Indians a great deal of problems. In addition to that, I still believe that Benteen would have been his ace in the hole, as I don't believe the Indians knew he was back on the trail. Thats only my opinion Brent |
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Brent
Lt. Colonel
    
 
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 02 2007 : 1:45:21 PM
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Oh I agree--and he had some pre-battle advice to do exactly that(keep his command together). But he got fancy. And I'm not sure if the Indians knew Benteen was back in town and had "reinforced" Reno, but I recall reading several places where they were wondering if (when?) those soldiers were going to do something--which,of course, they didn't. |
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Sgtmajor109th
Captain
    
USA
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Posted - November 02 2007 : 2:56:13 PM
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Brent, One thing I wanted to point out to you earlier was a letter I read that Lt. Gibson at wrote his wife on Jul 4,1876. He tells of joining Reno on the hill, and goes on to say, "Indians were swarmed around us,like devils, thousands of them, all with mordern rifles, while we were using old carbines."
The other thing is that Custer knew long before the LBH battle that the Indians were well armed and growing in strenght. A John E. Smith wrote Custer in Feb 1874, from what I could find out about Smith was he had something to do with the Indian Agencies. He tells Custer each lodge has one and one half warriors abled bodied, two thirds well armed, he goes to tell of the weapons the Indians have. About half of those warriors remaining have repeating rilfes, Winchesters and all others have breech loaders. He also goes on to say that the Indians had as many as 3,000 rds of ammo per weapon. So Custer knew in advance what he was going to be facing. His scouts told him, but for some unknown reason he shrugged it off. If he had that information in 1874 he should have known that in 1876 it could only be greater. I don't know why a commander would ignore his scouts, and seperate his command and attack a well armed and well manned village blindly with out any kind of a plan. |
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
    
   
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 02 2007 : 5:23:13 PM
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Are you saying they killed Custer with sticks and dirt clods?
As far as the Springfield the effective range of the carbine it is well over 250 yards and the sights were adjustable for greater ranges. The reason I picked that distance is that the Indians lever-action rifle and carbines used pistol ammunition and were not effective at 250 yards. It was poor marksmanship along with to many Indians that did in Custer's battalion.
Are you saying Custer's troops were less likely to fix their carbines in the field than Reno's troops?
Prolar I would agree with you that giving up 25% of the carbines to improve accuracy is a noble goal but did it occur is the question?
AZ Ranger
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“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
SEMPER FI |
Edited by - AZ Ranger on November 02 2007 5:26:19 PM |
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Sgtmajor109th
Captain
    
USA
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Posted - November 02 2007 : 10:16:44 PM
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AZ, had made the point that it was not the carbine or the ammunition for Custer's defeat, and I agree with that. It was not the problem with the weapons, but the lack of fire discipline. If deliberate direct, and accurate aimed fire was used the Indians could have been held at bay for a long time. The carbine had the range, and well directed fire control could have done the Indians a great amount of damage.
Take the british soldiers in 1879 at Rorke's Drift, a battle between the Zulus and the British. The british were out numbered by the hundreds, but well direct ed fire by the soldiers firing at point blank range into the masses of charging natives, killing or wounding hundreds of them, until the Zulus withdrew the field of battle. They had won a battle, against overwelming odds. Could Custer have done the same, in my opinion, I can only say maybe it was possible. It was a different place, battlefield and enemy. |
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chasber
Private

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Posted - November 07 2007 : 02:45:33 AM
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I know of two soldiers stating the number of rounds fired by each during the valley fight was 20 and 21. Also there are several accounts that the reserve ammo wasn't even opened when it arrived on Reno Hill. Add to this Reno's report to the Quartermaster, which shows that the reserve ammunition never came into play. This leads me to believe that it is very possible that ammunition was not nearly the factor it was claimed to be. The best quantification of the Springfield's effectiveness would be the number of casualties suffered by Reno's skirmish line while facing superior numbers armed with repeating rifles. |
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Brent
Lt. Colonel
    
 
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 07 2007 : 08:18:51 AM
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And I guess the least quantification may have been Custers command, out in the open facing those same factors. I'm often looking at it this way--if I personally had a choice and was a regular cavalry trooper, which would I want--a 16-shot Henry, or the single shot Springfield?? |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
    
   
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 07 2007 : 10:57:20 AM
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How many repeaters had the Sioux? Not many. Of those they had, how many were in prime shape, given they had no training in maintenance? If the Army found a higher failure rate with repeaters than the Springfield, why would the Indians do better? How much practice ammo did the Sioux have?
You're quantifying vapor. |
Dark Cloud copyright RL MacLeod darkcloud@darkendeavors.com www.darkendeavors.com www.boulderlout.com |
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Sgtmajor109th
Captain
    
USA
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Posted - November 07 2007 : 6:25:55 PM
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I do believe that the amount of ammunition fired in the valley fight was more then 20 rounds per man. Lt Varnum stated that while in the valley, men on the line were going back to get more ammunition from there saddlebags. And it was also stated that when men reach the hilltop they had very little ammo between them.
Reno made the statement that as the column was moving to the bluffs during the retreat, the Indians were along side with Winchester rifles, firing one shot after an other into the men.
Brent, if I had a choice I would have rather had a Henry or Sharps, then the single shot carbine. I also found an interesting note on the Springfield, one of the officers on the board that selected the Springfield was none other then Maj Marcus Reno. |
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prolar
Major
    

Status: offline |
Posted - November 07 2007 : 6:55:20 PM
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Sgt Major, Wasn't the Sharps a single shot? |
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Sgtmajor109th
Captain
    
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 07 2007 : 7:47:03 PM
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Prolar, my mistake ,wanted to say the Spencer Repeating Carbine. |
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chasber
Private

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Posted - November 08 2007 : 12:20:38 AM
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I would suggest men leaving the skirmish line were more interested in the cover offered by the woods than the ammo with their horse. I also think men with very little ammunition would be clamboring for the reserve ammo when it arrived. Faulty singleshot rifles, being low on ammo, and facing overwhelming odds does provide a good cover for the breakdown of command. |
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Brent
Lt. Colonel
    
 
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 08 2007 : 08:02:42 AM
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DC: I guess the answer to the question of how many repeaters the Indians had is "More than Custer". And more than enough as it turned out. Who knows what condition they were in, or if the Indians were any good as marksmen. I'm guessing that whomever they obtained these weapons from, probably supplied a sufficent amount of ammo to go along. |
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Sgtmajor109th
Captain
    
USA
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Posted - November 08 2007 : 11:24:21 AM
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As for the men on the skirmish line, it was not the fact that they had to get to the woods frfor the lack of ammo. While on the skirmish line there was in my opinion no fire control. Lt Varnum claimed the men were firing up in the air. He also claimed that the Indians kept back 300 yards or more. If an officer had his men set the carbines for a range of 500 hundred yards, chances are they may have caused some damage, however if that range was not changed say to 300 yards then you would be firing over their heads.
In article by Greg Michno, he states that of all the firing done, and he claims over 5,000 rds fire,, damage was only done to some tepee's and killed few indians. And Reno did not go into the woods because of ammo or problems with the carbine. He moved into the woods because the Indians were closing on his left flank and getting into his rear. Reno claims that out of 380 carbines only six had problems.
As for Indian weapons I cannot say much for it is not known to any of us there condition. It has been told by others that the Indians on the retreat would ride along side and just keep pumping shells into the column. And they must of had to be good at aiming, has they were hitting men on the bluffs and killed as we know, Dewolf and some others.
When Benteen reached the Hill many of his men were sharing there amminution with men of Reno's command, when the ammuniton packs were sent for. Once a again, as for the carbine in the valley, I found no where that anyone had a problem with it. The problem was that Reno was no Indian fighter had little or no experience fighting Indians, and the lack of disciplined fire control. They had a good weapon and ammuniton, and if all had been used properly they could have "maybe" done more damage. Granted it was a single shot weapon, but it had a great range, and if claimed by Lt Varnum that they stayed 300 yards away, and you were not hitting any of them, then something was wrong. and it was not the weapon or the ammo. A weapon is only as good as the man behind it. |
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
    
   
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 12 2007 : 12:12:57 AM
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Certainly there were some marksmen among the troopers. They should have been the only ones attempting shots in excess of 300 yards. The lack of discipline on the skirmish line cannot be fixed under combat conditions. Reno needed to regroup and regain control of his battalion. I believe by going to the hill it allowed time to regroup.
Hits are the only thing that counts. Missing faster is not something that a person shooting a repeater receives kudos. If it could be demonstrated that the single-shot carbine shooters made mostly hits and just could not keep up with the number of targets then it could be problem of the weapon system. Accurate fire is always better than speed or rate of inaccurate fire.
AZ Ranger |
“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
SEMPER FI |
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chasber
Private

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Posted - November 13 2007 : 9:33:36 PM
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While searching for a statement by an officer that confirms Benteen's men were told to share their ammo (which I have yet to find) I ran across Hares statement that he fired 12 rounds while in the valley. So we have 21, 20 and now 12. Another point to consider, All the indians Reno faced in the valley were mounted. Hitting an Indian size target at 300 to 500 yards does take a fair shot, hitting a horse size target at that same range should be easily accomplished. I know of no account that identifies even a single dead pony in the valley much less the dozens that should have been there had that rate of fire been sustained for that long. |
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Sgtmajor109th
Captain
    
USA
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Posted - November 14 2007 : 2:49:04 PM
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I think if you read the post correctly,it doen't say an officer said the men from Benteens men were sharing ammunition with Reno,s men. I have read in some articles that when Benteen arrived some men shared ammo with his men. Now it keeps coming up that some men only fired a few rds of ammo. That maybe right however, there were those who fired more.
In "Troopers With Custer" Lt Varnum states, we were nearly out of ammunition when we did leave. He goes on to say that what was left of Reno's command did not average five cartridges to the man when we reached the bluffs. Also while in the woods he states that, he came up to Capt Moylan's command, he dismounted and went up to the line, he then heard Moylan call out that his men were then out of ammunition, and ordered alternate men to fall back and get more ammo from there saddlebags.
The other thing is you have to take into a account, is the 40 men that was lost in the valley, and you know that all those horses didn't get back to the buff. So you had the loss of that ammo plus weapons and horses. As for the men on the bluffs. Benteen arrived at 4:20 he did not go to Custer, but stayed with Reno. His reason given was to assist the wounded and the necessity for more ammunition. The ammo mules did not reach Reno until 5:10. And at the Reno Court of Inquiry B.F Churchill said the ammunition brought up was not opened till after they had returned from going down river. And Lt Mathey was asked, did you see that ammunition taken out of the boxes, he replied, not that he remembered. There- fore it is my opinion Benteens men passed out some of their ammo to Reno's men. |
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chasber
Private

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Posted - November 15 2007 : 5:43:59 PM
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Varnums statement about the five rounds was made 40 years after the battle. He does not make this statement in his COI testimony or either version of his personal memoirs nor does he mention men firing wildly. If you read his entire statement you find that the battalion left the woods just a few minutes after he heard Moylan and that this occurred when Moylans men were fighting from the cut bank. I would suggest that even Moylan would recognize the need to resupply his ammo well before he had men actually running out. Even so I doubt that very many if any of the rounds in the saddlebags would have been used in the few minutes before the battalion left the woods. |
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