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Brent
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
 Posted - November 24 2007 : 12:36:21 PM
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I'm not sure why he sent the whole battalion either. Because he did that, he must have expected they would find something. If they DID find something (and maybe even become engaged with the Indians) very possible Benteen was not going to get back in a timely manner.
Yet--we hear that he expected Benteen back soon, expected he would come quickly, etc. SO--did he really expect Benteen to find anything? If not, then a major mistake in sending the whole group instead of a few scouts.
Custer can't have it both ways.
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Sgtmajor109th
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 24 2007 : 4:33:37 PM
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We have to keep in mind that nobody other then those that were on the Crow's
Nest could see anything. Custer knew from what his scout's had told him that
the regiment had been spotted. Did he send Benteen on his scout to protect
his left flack, or was he concerned about the pack train, and possibly the
indians trying to escape. To me none of these carry any weight as far of the
plan Custer may have had. As I have said before he had enough scouts that
could have given him a warning of any indians on his left flack.
The other problem is that Custer did not gather enough information as to what
was in his front, here again he did not use his scouts as effectively as he
should have. He had no knowledge of what the indians where doing, no knowledge
of the terrain he was going into. He had no knowledge as to where Benteen was,
once he got to the lone tepee, he should have halted and brought Benteen back
up with the rest of the regiment, instead he just kept sending word to Benteen
to keep going from one ridge to an other. And he sent Reno with three Co's of
troops with out any knowledge as to what was before them. Bad mistake, his plan
had to many flaws |
Sgtmajor |
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Brent
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 25 2007 : 08:57:29 AM
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That's about exactly as I see it, Sgtmajor. A good plan if he had a lot more time and information, but under the conditions Custer was operating in, too complicated and uncoordinated.
As far as what Benteen,was supposed to be doing, I have to go with what Lt.Gibson said --"Benteens battalion was sent to the left about 5 miles to see IF (IF!!) the Indians were trying to escape up the Valley of the LBH, after which we were to hurry and rejoin the command as soon as possible".
To me that sounds like an information gathering expedition-nothing more. And since the "hurry and rejoin the command" part is in there, I don't think Custer really expected to find anything. Benteens whole battalion was sent "just in case"--and it turns out his battalion was sorely needed elsewhere. |
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Sgtmajor109th
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 25 2007 : 9:43:51 PM
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Brent, you are right about Benteen, as he writes himself that if he found
anything, he was to notify Custer. The thing is Custer was on Reno Hill when
Reno began his attack. Here he sent Kanipe with a massage for the packs. He
moved on for 1 mile, knows that Reno is engadged, and according to Reno he
had sent 2 messages to Custer, and we know those 2 men died with Custer. He
then moves, according to Matin towards MTC, goes a short distance and then
sends the message with Martin to Benteen. Now he does not know how far back
the packs are, and secondly does not know if Benteen had come back to the
trail, and thirdly he keeps moving away from his support.
He had to know that Reno was in trouble, and had to know that no support was
going get there quick enough to help Reno out. He had five Co's of troops
with him, all under good commanders. If he had taken one of the troops and
had sent them to support Reno, I believe he would have put the indians in
a bad spot. Reno in the woods, now another force attacking the indians from
the rear, and 4 Co's attacking at MTC. Plus Benteen moving up, would have
caused the indians to split their forces.
To me the whole key to the battle was in the attack that Reno made. Had he
been properly supported. If he had done as I stated above. Reno attacking
and then another Company following up, and then Benteen supporting those
two attacks, maybe we wouldn't be writing about the LBH today. I wonder
sometimes how many times that battle was fought over the years, and how many
times Custer won. |
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chasber
Private
Status: offline |
Posted - November 26 2007 : 3:02:37 PM
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| SgtMjr, I see it differently, I do not think Reno was in trouble I think he was just fighting Indians. A competant commander should have been able to engage those Indians for a couple of hours at least. The Springfields with proper fire control would have kept the Indians back well beyond the range of practically all their own weapons. The skirmish line did not suffer a single casualty until it broke down. Reno was not driven from the woods he chose to leave. That Reno was the first man that went into the woods after the horse holders and medical staff and that he was to first man to leave the woods running for the hills says all that needs to be said about the man. I guess I need to correct myself, Reno's command was not in trouble, just Reno. |
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Sgtmajor109th
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 26 2007 : 4:15:21 PM
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Well it has always been my contention that there was no fire control used in
Reno's attack. The problem with the skirmish line was the lack of proper sup-
port which should have fell to company "G". Which could have been used to pro-
tect the left flack of the skirmish line. Reno did not have enough soldiers on
the line to protect his left flank. Once the indians took advantage of this
weakness, Reno moved to the woods. However you still have to keep in mind that
they not only got around his left flank, but also his rear.
If an other company had been sent to Reno's support, it is my contention it
would have made a difference in his attack, and would have more control of his
troops. Keep one thing in mind all of problems came about when he realized
there was no support, what ever he had to do, he had to do it alone. This had
caused him to panic, he just didn't know what to do, he did not consult his
officers as to what to do. It has been said by many of his officers that the
woods were good for a defense, and they could have held out for a few hours.
But they also say if the ammunition lasted. There are many if, ands, and buts
however if Custer had supported Reno as I had said, it would have made a big
difference.
My theory based on what the cavalry did in the civil war and a tactic that was
used by Custer many times and used with a great amount of success. And used by
Buford at Gettysburg Jul 1, and he only had 2,900 cavalry against Gen Heth's 3
brigades of infantry. And he held his line for over 4 hours with very low loss
of men. And not all had repeating carbines, many had Sharps carbines. Heth's
losses were high. |
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chasber
Private
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Posted - November 26 2007 : 5:52:21 PM
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| With the scouts Reno had 180 men. I'm not sure if more men would have helped him as he failed to properly use the men he had. What he needed most was someone there to tell him what to do. I wonder if those who denied Custer's requests to replace Reno felt any guilt for what happened. |
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Sgtmajor109th
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 26 2007 : 6:09:22 PM
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Good point, you would also have to wonder why Custer would chose a man to
make an attack that had no experience fighting indians. |
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chasber
Private
Status: offline |
Posted - November 26 2007 : 10:22:08 PM
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| To assign that task to anyone other than the regiments second ranking field grade officer would have been a humiliating insult to Reno and an affront to established military protocol. This also challenges talk of Custer's nepotism as on the day of his greatest battle with the American Indian his regiment was divided and assigned strictly by the book. |
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Sgtmajor109th
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 26 2007 : 11:56:17 PM
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Custer could divide his regiment any he had wished. He is the commander in
the field and therefore he is responsible for any assignments or plan that
he may put into motion. I do not think in any shape or form that Custer would
worry about insulting Reno. As the commander if he had formed any kind of plan
which he didn't, he would use who ever he felt could accomplish his plan. That
would include using Benteen where ever he planned to put him in the attack.
Other then those in charge of Companies, there was only one commander on the
ground and that was Custer. I do not think that Custer ever thought of Reno
as 2nd in command. If he had done so he would have spent more time conferring
with Reno, and keeping him up to speed as to what was taking place. Custer had
no more use for Reno then he did Benteen. And when he was sent on his scout
prior to the LBH, and returned Custer wanted to bring him up on charges for
disobeying orders.
Custer knew that Benteen was better qaulified to fighting the indians the Reno
but Custer sent him to the left as a way of getting back at Benteen. But in the
end Benteen pulled one better, when Custer needed him, he didn't responed. If
Reno was 2nd in command, he proved to be a complete failure. Custer did as
Custer wanted to do, and with Custer there was only one book and that was his. |
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Brent
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 27 2007 : 08:39:52 AM
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Chasbar: I imagine there was a lot of guilt and finger pointing all around after LBH. I also imagine there were a few folks squirming a bit when Reno asked for his court of inquiry. But no official action was ever taken against anyone, so --??
And then you have General Miles who comments later that Custer's LBH battle plan was one of the most brilliant he'd ever seen. Go figure.
Here's my tidy summation of the battle:
Custer fumbles
Reno falters
Benteen dawdles
Battle lost. |
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Sgtmajor109th
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 27 2007 : 10:38:17 AM
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| Brent, you hit the nail on the head. |
Sgtmajor |
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Brent
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 27 2007 : 10:48:01 AM
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Thanks!!
Would make a rather short book though |
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Sgtmajor109th
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 27 2007 : 12:50:08 PM
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| Brent, Keep me in mind, I would like a signed copy. |
Sgtmajor |
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chasber
Private
Status: offline |
Posted - November 27 2007 : 1:12:12 PM
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| It is not widespread in LBH literature but there is evidence that Custer and Reno rode alone together for some time prior to Reno's advance. What was said is known only to them and I don't think Reno ever alluded to it having taking place. If you look at Upton's cavalry manual on how to divide a regiment into battalions you will find that the 7th was divided just like the manual says it should be. |
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Sgtmajor109th
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 27 2007 : 3:44:44 PM
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Chasber, I don't think how the regiment divided was the problem. The problem
was dividing the regiment before you knew what was ahead of you and to set
yous plans to how to attack. Keep in mind that Benteen had mentioned to Custer
that should he not keep the regiment together, Custer brushed him aside by
telling him he had his orders. Perhaps Custer may have been wise to have taken
the suggestion.
However you have to keep in mind, although I have not read Upton's manuel, but
I do not feel it would suggest dividing your command as Custer did. Keep in
mind once he crossed MTC, he divided his command again, which also they were
not in supprting distance of each other except for Keogh and Calhoun. Custer
then left them and moved further north, over half maile and dropped off another
company on cemetery ridge while he went down to find a place to cross the river.
By the time he got back up on the hill Keogh and Calhoun were hotly engadged
and the indians had gotten between him and Calhoun and Keogh was being driven
to Custers position on the hill. He split his command to many times. He could
not support any of them because of distance, and the indians taking advantage
of the of openings in his lines. He made know effort to block any avenues of
approch to the indians. He moved over 4 miles from any kind of support from
Reno or Bentten. The way was open for the indians to block any support of get-
ting through to him. The books tell you how to fight on foot, how to fight in
skirmish line, how to make a charge, how to retreat. Those books were not
written to fight indians. |
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Brent
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 28 2007 : 05:33:15 AM
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Chasber: Wish we all knew who said what to whom!! That seems to be a recurring problem at LBH--seems nobody really knew what they were expected to do.
I agree about the dividing of the unit. Tho done by the manual (which manual probably wasn't written and designed to fight Indians)and technically correct, the actual dividing was a poor tactic given the circumstances.
And I know Custer thought he'd find a running village, but to simply think the Indians would flee for their lives at the mere sight of the 7th was a gross underestimation of the enemy.
SGtmajor: I'll sign with an extra large "X" just for you! |
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Sgtmajor109th
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 28 2007 : 12:45:33 PM
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| Thanks Brent, looking forward to that big X |
Sgtmajor |
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Sgtmajor109th
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 28 2007 : 3:19:10 PM
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Having not read Upton's cavalry tactics, I have read Casey's, almost the
same, except that Upton had made some changes. In both cases I am sure
that neither had a blue print for fighting indians. From what you can
gather, operations against the indians was and improvised affair. And as
far as I know there was no official doctrine to cover it.
Custer had done a better job of going by the book then his subordinates.
He did set up wings as called for in the book. He had Co's C,L,and I, in
the right wing and F, and E. in the left. He used company "I" which was
Keogh's company in reserve when the skirmish was placed on Calhoun ridge.
This by the book. At this point Capt Keogh is 2nd in command
Now when Reno charged down the valley, he then called to fight on foot
he by the book in his charge, he had 2 company's in front and 1 company
behind. When he halted and set up his skirmish line, company "G" should
have been so many paces behind the skirmish line and in the center to
support the skirmish line. Company "G" would not support the skirmish
but is also used to protect the flacks of the line.
As you know company "G" went into the woods, leaving Reno's left flack
open to the indians. According to the book it is the job of the officer's
and NCO's to keep the men calm and to direct fire. However sense there
was poor leadership shown by Reno, that the skirmish fell apart. And once
again the book also says, if for any reason you should have to retreat
the commander should establish a rear guard to protect the retreat from
the rear and flacks. I also may add here, it is still used to this day.
In my opinion, for some I think Upton's tactics was used in the same
manner as the Sears catalog. |
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 03 2007 : 8:10:58 PM
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I find it strange you think Custer did it better. How can one be sure of all those formations you describe? From the markers and spurious markers? Isn't it always better to make the other side die in combat? The Springfield could not work miracles.
As far as the Springfield being sufficient for a large number of Indians, again Custer proves it not to be true. There is a limit of enemy numbers that any number of troops can stand against regardless of weapon system. Since the Army recognized that marksmanship was a problem which is not the fault of the weapon maybe the quality of training and practical applications are issues.
Since this the Springfield thread I would hope posts reflect the Weapon and its effectiveness or not regarding LBH.
AZ Ranger |
“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
SEMPER FI |
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Sgtmajor109th
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 03 2007 : 8:55:52 PM
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As to the first part of question, I would think the answer rather simply.
I don't know if Custer did it any better. But the indians say he did. As
for the scattered markers, it is called disintegration of the lines.
As for the Springfield I am sure that Custer used very effectively. How
good or bad it was I can't say, I wasn't there. But it is very simple to
understand. Custer and his command was out numbered and out gunned, and the
indians showed better genearalship. No matter what is said about the Spring-
field, by me or anybody else, on even terms the soldiers most likely would
have won the day, but the odds was against them, and I don't think anyone
is blameing the Springfield. Would better and more effective training with
the weapon have made a difference, I don't think so. And you just can't
put Custer in the mix, Crook wasn't very effective either and he is claimed
to have fired 25,000 rds, doing very little damage to the indians. |
Sgtmajor |
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chasber
Private
Status: offline |
Posted - December 07 2007 : 4:12:51 PM
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I don't know if it was the numbers, I think it well may have been more the time. The Springfield was capable of keeping the Indians well back. The Indian wouldn't risk the casualties of an overwhelming charge even though they did have the numbers to pull one off. With time though the Indians could slink within range of their own weapons at less risk to themselves. I think it is safe to say that the Springfield was very effective during the valley and hilltop fight and for Custer's battle it was equally so, for a time.
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Sgtmajor109th
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 07 2007 : 8:35:22 PM
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It has been interesting to find the number of those at the LBH that have
said the same thing I have been saying and that is fire control, inadeguate
training in marksmanship, and fire discipline. Once again it was not the
weapon, but the fact is that weapons are no better then the men who use them.
In a book written by Larry D. Underwood. how the indians met Reno's charge
some on horses and most on foot. he states the line was under a hail of heavy
fire from bullets and arrows. The officers and NCO's dashing up and down the
line shouting orders. Those indians on horses dashed in and out. Those on foot
knelt and fired ran forward and fired again, much to the surprise of the troop
ers the first wave from the hugh camp was replused so that does show for a
short period of time there was fire control.
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 12 2007 : 12:56:34 AM
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Of course Custer didn't use the 45-70 Springfield. He had brass cases in his .50-70. Its not called disintegration if the markers are spurious. It called imaginary.
The .45-70 carbine was hindered because of the terrain and the way Indians fight. A skirmish line was not very effective against them unless you were running which causes them to chase and then you stop and form a skirmish line such as the retreat from Weir. |
“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
SEMPER FI |
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 12 2007 : 01:05:36 AM
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The spurious markers are not necessarily the scattered ones they are ones that do not represent anyone that died on the Custer battalion part of the battlefield. You must remove them before you can discuss what the remaining markers would indicate.
Do you know how many spurious markers are mixed into the Custer portion of the battlefield? |
“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
SEMPER FI |
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Springfield Carbine
