"I Have No Division!" ... High Tide of the Confederacy

"Let your work this day be for victory or death"

In April of 1861 a decade of Political turmoil exploded into civil war. The divisive controversy of states rights had plagued the United States throughout it�s existence. During the 1850s this question of allegiance and of power became the dominating issue in debates everywhere from congress to dinner tables across the country. On this, and all the other important questions of the time, including slavery, industrialization, and the tariff, the general opinion of the south was opposite to the north�s position. When Abraham Lincoln, a passionate unionist and suspected abolitionist, was elected to be the 16th president in 1860 a secession became inevitable. On December 20th 1860 South Carolina proclaimed her status as an independent republic and was soon joined by seven other southern slave states. In April of 1861 the Confederate military forces under General P.G.T Beauregard captured Fort Sumter and its small federal garrison, shortly after, another three states joined the southern confederacy. The country was now unquestionably divided and war was unavoidable.

What both sides thought they would quickly and easily win, became a long, horrible contest with no end in sight. For two years the confederate Army of Northern Virginia dueled with the union Army of the Potomac for possession of a relatively small strip of Virginia land which separated the opposing capitols, Richmond and Washington. The monotonous string of indecisive battles yielded only casualties, the spoils of victory came to mean only the responsibility of burying the dead. The war had long succeeded in conquering the romantic spirit of the era and now tested the strength of men�s courage, patriotism, and ideals. The side which proved stronger in these qualities could very well win the war, but the northern leaders knew that the human and material resources of the south would run short long before those of the north. Fearing the moral and physical toll that was being paid by his native state, General Robert E. Lee desired to take the war into the land of his adversary and give Virginia a chance to cleanse herself of the patriotic blood which had been spilt on her soil. Thus the economic and civilian hardships of war would be transferred to the north. The plan was for the Confederate army to invade Maryland and Pennsylvania with 70,000 men. Lee�s objectives were to clear the Shenandoah Valley of federal garrisons, disrupt the northern economy and perhaps most importantly, for his troops to live off the abundant supplies of the enemy country for several weeks. Finally, they would force a favorable engagement and defeat the Army of the Potomac on it�s own ground, thereby gaining favorable terms for peace. On June 15 1863 the first elements of the Army of Northern Virginia crossed the Potomac into Maryland. The invasion of the north was begun.

On July 1, while en route to the Pennsylvania town of Gettysburg to requisition some footwear, General Heth�s Confederate division stumbled into two brigades of Union cavalry. The ensuing skirmish quickly became a battle and neither side was able to disengage. By nightfall the majority of both armies had taken the field. The Army of the Potomac found a strong position laced with high ground and forest. The line centered on a slowly rising elevation known as Cemetery Ridge. The ridge was not remarkably tall or steep, however, it rose out of a wide and open field, giving it command of the ground below. At the crest of the rise stood a low stonewall which, although not an ideal defensive structure, gave partial cover to it�s defenders. This stonewall ran parallel to the ridge and protruded at one point to form a right angle and then continued to extend along the crest, this small jut was made famous by Pickett�s charge and became known forever as The Angle. Behind the angle was a prominent cluster of trees which was made distinguishable by their solitude from other foliage, this became the conversion point of the massive assault which was made on Cemetery Ridge. The ridge afforded a view of the town below and of other notable landmarks on the battlefield, on a July evening at sunset this visual combines with the Comfortable Pennsylvania climate to create a quite pleasant atmosphere. The tranquil overlook would soon become the sight of one of the most memorable shows of valor, splendor, and horror in American military history.

A second day of extremely vicious and bloody combat came and went without any significant gains. Repeated infantry assaults on both the Union flanks revealed exactly how stubborn the Federal position was. Lee began to think desperate thoughts.

Lee�s invasion plans were without question designed to bring an end to the war. The costly battle that he had waged thus far dismayed him. Two years of fruitless victories had shown that the only way to bring a conclusion to being was a crushing victory leading to a direct threat on Washington. The attritionary nature of the war thus far would ultimately lead to the defeat of the south. Also Lee was by nature a gambler, his daring maneuvers and attacks had brought his army both victory and glory in the past. Therefore, Lee turned his attention to the weakest and most crucial position in the Union line, Cemetery Ridge. The capture of these heights would divide the enemy in two and they could then be separately crushed.

Lee had one fresh division which had arrived on the field too late to participate in the fighting on the first or second day of the battle. This 5000 man unit was commanded by 38 year-old General George S. Pickett, an energetic Virginian with a passion for glory. Pickett�s men were chosen to lead the attack. In addition, General Heth�s division, now commanded by Pettigrew, and two Brigades under General Trimble would join in the fight. This totaled an attack force of about 12000 men. However, the commands of Pettigrew and Trimble were badly damaged from the fighting on the first day, being the first units to arrive at the field of Gettysburg. Pettigrew�s command, which was the strongest Confederate division at the start of the campaign, now numbered only 4,500. Trimble could field not more than 2000 men. The attack would be supported by a large artillery force, 143 guns under the command of a young artillery officer, E. Porter Alexander. Unfortunately, the effect of Civil War ordinance at long range was notoriously limited. Pickett�s men would have to carry the bulk of the attack burden.

On the early morning of July 3rd Lee rode with his most trusted corps commander, James Longstreet, to the Confederate artillery position on Seminary Ridge, from here he observed the Union lines on Cemetery Ridge. The approach was difficult, the assaulting troops would have almost a mile of open terrain to cross before meeting enemy rifle fire. The advance would be under a perpetual artillery barrage from start to gruesome finish. not less than 103 Federal artillery pieces were in position to unleash a lethal fire on their enemy, causing casualties and disrupting formations. In addition, the structure of the Union line allowed a significant number of reinforcements to be added to the fight from positions all over the field before any confederate infantrymen reached Cemetery Ridge. Union Infantrymen totaled approximately 5,500 men, Winfield Hancock�s men of the II corps. The II corps was a respected fighting unit composed largely of battle tested veterans. They were commanded by a man who had risen to a legend in the Union army, Hancock "The Superb" had a magnificent reputation as a fine tactician with the determination of a bulldog.

In Lee�s planning for the assault on Cemetery Hill he made three serious miscalculations which led him to his fateful decision. Lee overestimated the size of his own attacking force, thinking it a full15000 strong. He expected the defenders to be weaker in number and in spirit than they proved to be. Lastly and perhaps most important of all, Lee depended on his artillery to successfully clear the enemy guns from the heights and therefore reduce the engagement to an infantry fight, with his troops holding a staggering advantage of over two men to one. Still, Lee did believe the plan to be sound and he felt that he had no other options. General Longstreet, however, cautioned his commander repeatedly, suggesting that these same troops be used for a maneuver around the Union left flank. Such a move would certainly meet less resistance and possibly force a withdrawal from the strong positions on the Round Tops and Devil�s Den, which Longstreet had tried desperately to seize on the preceding day. But Lee was both stubborn and confident and his subordinate�s credible advice was lost on him.

Early that afternoon the combined forces of Pickett, Pettigrew, and Trimble were gathered on Seminary Ridge where they waited in nervous anticipation for the order to be given for them to advance. These soldiers were veterans of perhaps a dozen engagements. They had all seen the field of battle, experienced the terror of war. They had all felt the fear that every enemy shell carries into a soldier�s heart. Yet they knew that this was different. That their odds were stacked higher than ever before. In a gambling room most men would not take such odds, yet on the battlefield, with the stakes raised higher than in any game, they were all willing to make the charge.

At 1:00 PM, Alexander�s artillery batteries opened fire from Seminary Ridge. The huge number of cannons firing simultaneously created an awesome spectacle. By far the largest cannonade of the war, several sources report hearing the thunder of the guns in Pittsburgh, over 200 miles from Gettysburg. Only a few minutes after the Rebels unleashed this massive storm of iron and lead, Federal artillery began to return the fire. The Union batteries created a quite hellish blast as well. The combined effect of these two deadly giants hurling their wrathful shell across the field at each other was "indescribably grand", according to Federal artillery chief Henry Hunt. The cannonade was by no doubt a magnificent show of force, however, it was rather ineffective. Lee�s plan was based on the assumption that Alexander�s barrage would force the enemy batteries to withdraw from their strong firing positions and hopefully weaken the infantry positions. In this objective they clearly failed. The Union officers reported less than two-hundred casualties and most of the guns cleared from the hills were promptly replaced from the deep reserve behind the Union lines. This proved decisive in the outcome of the attack as the Confederate infantry were decimated during their long advance through the open field which separated the two armies. Thus the charge was effectively lost before it began.

Meanwhile, behind the Confederate lines, General Longstreet continued desperately to plead with Lee to cancel the assault. Lee, however, was as firmly set in commencing with the attack as Longstreet was against it and the now depressed Longstreet reluctantly rested his argument. Sometime around 2:30 Alexander sent an urgent note to Pickett:

With these words, and Lee�s insistence on adhering to his plan, it was clear that the attack would be made within an hour. When Pickett showed the note to Longstreet and asked for permission to advance, Longstreet, choked up with sadness, could only give a nod of permission. Pickett then excitedly exclaimed "I will lead my division forward sir", and he rode off towards his troops to seize his moment of glory on the field of battle which he so desperately craved.